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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
to help prevent a head-on collision between the oncoming plaintiff's car
and a dump-truck which was passing the dairy truck ° In another case,
a plaintiff complained that a swiiging toilet room door fell upon her.
The door was located in defendant's theatre. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was held inapplicable, on the theory that the door was not within
the exclusive control of the defendant 2 l
Finally, the keys-m-the-ignition situation arose again in Cleveland.
The first reported case was surveyed last year.2  In that case a thief stole
a car and negligently caused damage. The owner was, on his demurrer,
held possibly negligent for violating a Cleveland ordinance forbidding
leaving a car parked with the keys in the ignition. In Wagner v. Arthur2 3
in a similar situation, but with a different judge, the demurrer was up-
held. The difference was this: While the plaintiff was struck in Cleve-
land as before, the car had been stolen in Columbus where there is no
such ordinance.
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TRADE REGULATION
Trade-Name Usage
Trade-names differ somewhat from trade-marks, and the exclusive
right to use a trade-name imposes a more burdensome restriction upon
competitors than the right to use a trade-mark.' Normally, the law of
unfair competition does not protect a name which is descriptive of a ve-
hicle or article unless there has developed a secondary meaning.2 Thus
the word "yellow" in combination with other words such as "Yellow Taxi-
cab Company" may acquire a secondary meaning and be entitled to pro-
tection. The acquisition of a secondary meaning is a question of fact,
regardless of the length of user.4 Thus the controlling fact is that such
a meaning has been acquired in the mind of the public.
A controversy which involved the foregoing general principles ap-
plicable to trade-names arose in Springfield, Ohio.5 The plaintiff, Circle
Cab Company, was incorporated in 1946 and had operated a cab business
in that city continually thereafter. Defendant, Springfield Yellow Cab
' Roush v. Hillman, 134 N.E.2d 170 (Ohio App. 1954).
'Warner v. Interstate Theatres, Inc., 137 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App. 1952). But
compare the holding of another court that the doctrine did apply to a collapsing bar
stool. Gow v. Multnomah Hotel, Inc., 191 Ore. 45, 224 P.2d 552 (1950).
2See 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 340 (1956).
' 134 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
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Company, had been duly licensed by the City of Springfield to operate
taxicabs under the name "Yellow Cab." Circle operated 35 cabs in 1951,
all bearing the name of Circle Cab Company. During 1952 Circle ob-
tained a valid city license and operated one of these cabs under the name
of "Yellow Cab." It continued to operate one cab so designated through-
out 1953 and into 1954 when the lawsuit began. Circle in fact obtained
a license to so operate in each of these years but under circumstances
which technically disqualified them as being renewals of the 1952 license
and invalid as new licenses because no public hearing was held as to
either the 1953 or 1954 license issuances. Springfield had received a
license to operate under the same trade name. Circle sued Springfield
and Springfield sued Circle, both actions being consolidated in the com-
mon pleas court, with the result that Circle obtained an injunction against
Springfield prohibiting the use of the words "Yellow" or "Yellow Cab"
in connection with its taxicabs.
Springfield appealed on both law and fact, and the two cases were
heard together in the court of appeals. The judgment of the court of
common pleas was reversed and Springfield was granted an injunction
against Circle using the word "Yellow Cab" in its taxicab business.
The decision of the court of appeals was based upon the following
grounds: (1) technically the 1953 and 1954 licenses issued to Circle were
invalid for procedural defects and therefore the use of the words "Yellow
Cab" was not rightful under the circumstances; (2) even assuming a
proper user for a period of years, the purpose of such user was to keep
out competition; (3) the user in connection with one cab only was so
limited that no secondary meaning had been acquired which was entitled
to protection; (4) Springfield, being duly licensed by the city to operate
cabs with the designation "Yellow Cab," was entitled to enjoin the user
of such words by Circle.
The novel part of the holding in this case is that Springfield seemed
entitled to protection of its trade-name "Yellow Cab" upon a mere show-
' 1 NIms, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 45 (4th ed.
1947)
21 NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs § 46 (4th ed.
1947)
'Yellow Cab Co. v. Cooks Taxicab & Transfer Co., 142 Minn. 120, 171 N. W 269
(1919)
I1 NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs § 38a (4th ed.
1947)
'Circle Cab Co. v. Springfield Yellow Cab Co., 137 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio App. 1954)
'For purposes of brevity and simplicity in the discussion of this decision, the plaintiff
will be referred to as "Circle" and the defendant as "Springfield" during the re-
mainder of the article.
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